Brexit:challenges for environmental law by Reid, Colin T.
                                                              
University of Dundee
Brexit
Reid, Colin
Published in:
Scots Law Times
Publication date:
2016
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication in Discovery Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Reid, C. T. (2016). Brexit: challenges for environmental law. Scots Law Times 2016 27 (pp. 143-147).
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in Discovery Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
 • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from Discovery Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
 • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
 • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 07. Nov. 2017
1 
 
BREXIT: Challenges for Environmental Law 
 
Colin T Reid 
University of Dundee 
 
The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU raises many issues.  This paper gives a brief 
overview of some of the challenges in the context of environmental law, considering the 
structural issue of how UK and EU law are entwined, the international dimension and 
possible implications for the substance of environmental law.  The complexities of 
negotiating the withdrawal and of co-ordinating the legal measures to achieve formal 
withdrawal and to establish whatever new relationships are to be in place with the EU and 
the wider world are not considered. 
 
At a simplistic level achieving “Brexit” may seem straightforward.  Parliament just has to 
repeal the European Communities Act 1972 and the authority of all EU law - the evil 
Eurocrats in Brussels and the meddling judges in Luxembourg - disappears.  Unfortunately 
it is not as simple as that.  After over 40 years EU law is not a separate entity existing apart 
from the rest of our law but is integrated into our law in many ways and has shaped the way 
we do so many things.   
 
 
How EU law is embedded 
 
It is in the very nature of the EU legal system that the provisions of EU law are not distinct 
from domestic law but embedded in it.  There are some examples of directly applicable EU 
law which stands apart and can be readily isolated, but in most areas there is at a least some 
interconnection with domestic law.  Moreover, you cannot flick through the statute book and 
see immediately which provisions come from the EU and which are home-grown.  Four 
main categories of EU based provisions can be identified along with the simpler case where 
EU law stands alone and complete:  
 
1) All of the relevant law is to be found in EU measures: 
In some cases the Treaty provisions and EU regulations offer a complete legal picture on a 
topic.  This, however, is rare since usually some supporting UK measures are needed to set 
broader regulatory frameworks, to authorise public bodies to act or to support 
implementation. 
 
2) Legislation which was inspired by the need to comply with EU obligations but is 
completely self-contained in UK legislation: 
There are many examples of this, such as the provisions on public registers in various 
regulatory regimes, e.g. the Pollution Prevention and Control (Scotland) Regulations 2012 
(SSI 2012/360) reg.64.  Such registers were first introduced as part of response to the 
original EU Directive on public access to environmental information (Dir. 1990/313) but 
stand on their own regardless of that background (although there may be questions of 
interpretation as noted later). 
 
3) Legislation which was inspired by EU obligations but is largely self-contained although 
with occasional references to EU measures: 
An example here is the Environmental Assessment (Scotland) Act 2005 which was inspired 
both by the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (Dir. 2001/42) and by the desire 
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of the Scottish Government to embed this as a wider policy tool, not limited to the specific 
categories of plans covered by the EU requirement.  The text has a few references to EU 
measures in defining the exact scope of the provisions (e.g. s.4(3)) but all the key parts of 
the Act can stand on their own, regardless of the EU background, and it would be possible to 
make the Act work without the EU elements when EU law is no longer relevant. 
 
4) Legislation where incorporation of EU law is an essential element for the law to make 
sense: 
An example here is that the legal definition of “waste” which lies at the centre of the law on 
that topic is essentially defined in terms of the EU Waste Directive (Dir. 2008/98) (Waste 
Management Licensing (Scotland) Regulations 2011, SSI 2011/228, reg.2).  This is clearly 
wholly unworkable if it is no longer possible to have any reference to EU law so that the 
whole framework in the domestic legal regime falls apart unless the EU measure is either 
replaced or allowed to continue to have legal force. 
 
5) Legislation which serves to support EU law and has no role or meaning at all if EU law is 
no longer regarded: 
There is some UK legislation which provides for the enforcement of EU laws where the 
substantive content of these rules is not set out in any UK law.  For example, the Control of 
Trade in Endangered Species (Enforcement) Regulations 1997, SI 1997/1372, supports 
controls on the import and export of endangered plants and animals by creating offences and 
conferring powers of entry and search, but the substantive rules on what species are covered 
and on when permits are required etc. are not set out in any UK law but solely in EU 
Regulations.  If EU law ceases to have effect, then there will be no law on this subject and 
nothing for 1997 UK Regulations to enforce.  A further aspect here is that the UK needs to 
have rules in this area to comply with its international obligations under the Convention on 
Trade in Endangered Species which the UK ratified in 1976.  
 
So what happens on Brexit Day?  If Parliament simply says that all EU laws no longer have 
legal force, we are left with a mess.  That approach would not eliminate all of the EU legacy 
since measures wholly embedded in UK legislation would continue unaffected.  It would 
also leave large chunks of UK law with major holes in them which will in effect prevent 
them from operating and open up a legal vacuum in areas where there would be no valid 
legal rules at all. 
 
If that is to be avoided, there seem to be two basic options.  The first is to review all of our 
laws, identify all of the provisions directly or indirectly linked to EU law, decide whether we 
want to lose them, keep them in amended form or continue them in force, and then replace 
every provision we want with a properly made domestic one, all to be achieved between 
now and Brexit Day.  This is a vast task and it seems unimaginable that there will be the 
resources to achieve this.  The alternative is to pass a law that provides that all the law in 
force on Brexit Day continues to have effect, including measures in EU legislation, whether 
free-standing or incorporated directly or by reference into domestic laws (cf. the example of 
Irish independence: Government of Ireland Act 1920, s.61).  This option provides 
continuity, avoids legal vacuums emerging and gives time for reflection and work in 
identifying what parts of EU-inspired law we want to keep and what we want to change or 
dispose of (although a few headline examples might perhaps be identified to disappear on 
Brexit Day).  Some such continuity of law provision is arguably essential as the default 
position while we undertake the more detailed assessment of what to keep, change or get rid 
of.  
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Interpretation  
 
Where the law has EU origins, either directly or indirectly, UK courts are currently bound, 
to interpret it in the light of the EU provisions and the case-law of the CJEU (European 
Communities Act 1972, s.3(1)).  This has led to the courts producing interpretations which 
stretch the words of a provision in a direction and to an extent which would not be the case 
if a purely domestic approach had been taken.  In the event of Brexit, there would clearly be 
no basis for stretching the words to ensure compliance with EU requirements, but the 
question arises of whether after that date all reference to the EU context should be forbidden.  
 
The approach taken in the Brexit legislation will be significant.  Unless that legislation 
expressly prohibits all reference to EU materials, then where a provision has an EU 
background, whether because it is domestic law inspired by the EU or an EU measure 
continued in force as proposed above, it would still be possible to refer to the EU context as 
one strand, although no longer the decisive one, in the task of interpretation.  If a more 
thorough extirpation of the EU inheritance is adopted, then all consideration of the EU 
background and materials, including the case-law from Luxembourg, would be excluded, 
forcing an interpretation that ignores a key element of the context. 
 
Moreover, there is also the question of whether existing interpretations, reached by UK 
courts but based on EU material, could be re-visited to take account of the withdrawal, 
focusing attention on the statutory provisions themselves and their narrower UK context 
without being influenced by the wider EU background.  For example, even if the definition 
of “waste” currently found in EU legislation were to be continued after Brexit, would it 
possible to go back several steps and develop a distinctly British interpretation of it, based 
on the statutory words alone and British rules of interpretation, setting aside the attempts of 
the British courts over the years to make sense of and apply the Delphic comments of the 
European Court (see the comments of Carnwath LJ in R (OSS Group Ltd) v Environment 
Agency [2007] EWCA Civ 611, [2007] 3 CMLR 30, [2008] Env LR 8, [69])?  
 
 
Law-making power 
  
The European Communities Act 1972 confers on Ministers a very broad power to make 
laws “for the purpose of implementing any EU obligation …, or enabling any such 
obligation to be implemented, or of enabling any rights enjoyed … by virtue of the Treaties 
to be exercised” or “for the purpose of dealing with matters arising out of or related to any 
such obligation or rights” (s.2(2)).  This is a very heavily used power which provides the 
authority for subordinate legislation in a very wide range of areas, from the Control of Major 
Accident Hazards Regulations 2015, SI 2015/483 and the Environmental Information 
(Scotland) Regulations 2004, SSI 2004/520 to the Racing Pigeons (Vaccination) Regulations 
(Northern Ireland) 1995 SRO 1995/168 and the Sheep and Goats Identification and 
Movement (Interim Measures) (Wales) (Amendment) Order 2002, SI 2002/811.   
  
In most cases there will be overlapping powers within the specific domestic statutory 
regimes.  Nevertheless, the existence and use of such broad law-making powers has meant 
that in areas where the major policy and legal initiative lies in the hands of the EU, there has 
been no need to ensure that the terms of the most likely alternative domestic parent Acts 
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actually confer specific power to do everything that might be required.  In the absence of the 
catch-all provision under the 1972 Act, unfortunate lacunae might be found, inhibiting the 
government’s power to act in a range of circumstances.   
  
The ability to rely on the very broad powers in the 1972 Act has also avoided another area of 
possible legal complexity and uncertainty.  One of the features of the devolution settlements 
is that the Westminster authorities retain the power to legislate in matters where EU 
obligations and rights are concerned, even on topics which are normally devolved matters 
(e.g. Scotland Act 1998, s.57).  The ability to use this broad power to legislate at UK or 
Great Britain level has meant that where there is a willingness to allow London to act, there 
has been no need to dissect proposals into devolved and reserved matters and divide 
legislative responsibility accordingly.  This option for less fragmented legislation may no 
longer be available. 
 
 
Devolution 
 
This raises a further indirect but very important role of EU law at present: its effect in 
dampening the consequences of devolution.  Environmental law matters are largely 
devolved under the devolution settlements for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  There 
were differences between each country even before the current devolution structures were 
introduced, but these have become more pronounced since.  Differences exist in relation to 
the administrative structures, e.g. the greater integration which has led to the creation of 
Natural Resources Wales, to enforcement mechanisms, e.g. the different scope of so-called 
“civil sanctions” in each country, and to the substance of the law, e.g. in relation to the 
willingness to accept genetically modified crops and new nuclear power stations.   
 
Yet the facts that EU law accounts for so much of our environmental law and that all 
jurisdictions are bound to operate within the framework set by EU law have meant that the 
capacity for each country to head off in its own direction has been limited.  No country can 
decide to set its own water quality standards or to abolish controls on pesticides or to 
introduce far-reaching restrictions on diesel engines without falling foul of EU law and thus 
not only risking infringement proceedings from Europe but also, in the case of the devolved 
authorities, exceeding their legal powers.  There is room for national differences to emerge, 
but within limits. 
 
With Brexit, this constraint will be removed and the different counties could develop 
radically different environmental laws.  Providing the room for such difference is, of course, 
one of the major justifications for devolution in the first place, but there are consequences if 
the result is a fragmentation of the law.  The divergence of environmental law within the UK 
has not been viewed as a major issue, since the need to fit within the EU framework has 
ensured that such divergence will be kept within workable limits. In the absence of the EU, 
those affected by environmental laws that are becoming more differentiated may be more 
concerned at the prospect of increased divergence and there may be a call for new 
mechanisms for addressing the levels of co-ordination and difference on particular issues, 
akin to the Joint Nature Conservation Committee for biodiversity issues.  
 
 
International Obligations 
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The UK’s withdrawal from the EU does not free it from all external legal obligations.  The 
UK will continue to be bound by many international treaties, so that constraints on the UK’s 
freedom of action will continue.  Indeed it is often overlooked that what we see as EU 
measures are sometimes the result of international agreements which will continue to bind 
the UK even after Brexit.  Obligations in relation to air pollution, nature conservation, 
chemical safety and many other areas will continue, as will the obligations to provide access 
to information, public participation and access to justice under the Aarhus Convention.  One 
complication is that for treaties where the UK is bound because of the signature by the EU in 
areas of its exclusive competence the UK will have to become a party in its own right 
(subject to any negotiations with the EU and the other parties).  The key point, though, is 
that international obligations beyond the EU will continue to constrain the UK’s freedom of 
action.  The big difference, of course, is that whereas EU law is very detailed, the EU 
structures provides strong (if slow) measures to enforce compliance by states and domestic 
courts ensure that individuals can enjoy the rights conferred by EU law, the same does not 
apply for international law. 
 
New obligations are also inevitable.  The withdrawal agreement with the EU will create a 
new legal relationship, with more or less access to the Single Market and with that more or 
less freedom to set standards on environmental and other grounds.  The close links within 
the European Economic Area require the application of most EU standards but it is worth 
noting that even the looser trade agreements between the EU and other states, such as the 
Ukraine or Canada, include provisions seeking high levels of environmental standards, the 
application of the precautionary principle and a commitment not to relax environmental laws 
in order to attract trade or investment (e.g. Association Agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine, [2014] OJ L 161/3, arts 290, 292, 296). 
 
 
Substantive Impact 
 
As well as these primarily structural points about the shape and shaping of environmental 
law post-Brexit, the substantive nature of the law also needs to be considered.  The UK’s 
environmental law today is very different from environmental law when the UK joined the 
EU in 1973, and although undoubtedly the UK on its own would have made major steps 
towards environmental improvement, membership of the EU has certainly ensured that 
action was taken on a faster timetable and more thoroughly than would otherwise have been 
the case.  The likelihood is that much of the law will continue as it is, but four general points 
can be made within this large and complex area, in addition to the risk of fragmentation 
within the UK already mentioned in relation to devolution. (For a more thorough analysis 
see: Burns et al, The EU Referendum and the UK Environment: An Expert Review available 
at http://environmentEUref.blogspot.co.uk/). 
 
The first is to note that obligations inspired by EU law tend to be of a rather different nature 
from those which were based on purely domestic rules prior to the UK’s membership. EU 
environmental law has tended to impose obligations on Member States, that is on Ministers, 
which are based on targets to be met (e.g. recycling rates) or outcomes to be achieved (e.g. 
specific air or water quality).  This is different from the approach in older domestic law 
which tended to favour very broad statements of purposes or functions supported by largely 
discretionary powers, leaving it to the executive body concerned (e.g. the Minister or an 
agency) to determine for itself the outcome that should result once all relevant 
considerations have been duly taken into account.  Although the use of fixed standards is 
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now an accepted part of UK environmental law, it is possible that some discretion might 
return, allowing some room for manoeuvre when meeting the standards seems particularly 
difficult, expensive or disproportionate or conflicts with other policy goals. 
 
A second point is that EU law provides a means of calling the government to account.  
Where it is argued that a state is falling short of its obligations under EU law there are means 
(imperfect though they are) for using the Court of Justice to seek compliance.  Moreover, the 
UK courts themselves are in a positon to insist that the authorities keep to the long-term 
promises embodied in EU law, such as in the recent litigation over air quality targets (R 
(ClientEarth) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2015] 
UKSC 28).  In the absence of the EU dimension, however, there are much more challenging 
questions over how the government can be held to account over its environmental 
commitments, as shown in the debates and uncertainty about the status and enforceability of 
the greenhouse gas reduction targets in the Climate Change Acts (e.g. Reid, “A New Form 
of Duty? The Significance of ‘Outcome’ Duties in the Climate Change and Child Poverty 
Acts” [2012] Public Law 749). 
 
A third point is to note the comparative stability of EU environmental law and policy.  It 
takes a long time for initiatives to proceed through the EU law-making process, but once 
made, they tend to “stick”, without constant change.  This makes them well-suited to the 
long-term efforts required to tackle major environmental problems such as water quality and 
climate change.  The setting of targets for several years in the future and the stability of 
environmental standards enables industry and investors to plan ahead and allows for the 
integration of different policy areas to be developed.  The greater scope for rapid change 
outwith the EU brings both the advantages and disadvantages of flexibility, with the 
potential to respond more quickly to changing circumstances but also a lack of certainty as 
to the future.  
 
Related to this is the final point that the UK will now be able to make a choice over whether 
or not to maintain the law inherited from the EU.  Many of the major elements in our 
environmental law have EU origins, from environmental impact assessment through the 
definition of waste to air and water quality standards.  The UK - or rather in view of the 
devolution settlements, the devolved administrations - will have the choice whether or not to 
continue such measures, with or without adjustment (subject to the constraints that might 
arise in relation to future access to the Single Market).   There is no reason to expect a 
sudden and substantial change in most areas.  Nevertheless, the new freedom of action 
would allow for a radical strengthening of environmental protection on some issues, 
although the deregulatory tone of much of the current UK government’s rhetoric (and even 
more of the Leave campaign) might suggest that this flexibility is more likely to be used to 
reduce the extent to which environmental protection is pursued when it conflicts with other 
policy goals.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
For environmental law overall, the most significant changes are likely to be not so much in 
the details of any legislation, but the new vulnerability of environmental rules to short-term 
political pressures and the removal of the means by which the government can be called to 
account.  Whatever its flaws, the EU has provided a stable framework of environmental law 
and the means to ensure that governments and others live up to their obligations.  The post-
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Brexit world will be more volatile.  We do not know what the coming years will bring in 
terms of the details and timing of the UK’s withdrawal, the nature of future relationships 
with the EU and others or the extent to which existing laws based on EU measures will 
survive unchanged.  The one certainty is uncertainty. 
 
 
